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COMMENTS
DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION IN TITLE VII ACTIONS:
RIOS v. REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY
Tite VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discriminatory
employment practices based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.1 The Act provides a procedure whereby an individual alleging
employment discrimination may bring an action in a federal district
court.2 Upon a finding that an employer intentionally has engaged in
discrimination prohibited by the Act, the court is empowered to enjoin
the unlawful practices and to order appropriate affirmative action, in-
cluding the hiring or reinstatement of employeesY An employee,
however, is not limited to the remedies of Title VII.4 Frequently, the
1. Section 703 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (a) (Supp. 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1970).
2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was established to
investigate charges of violations of the Act. Id. § 2000e-4. If the EEOC determines that
there is reasonable cause to believe that a charge of employment discrimination is
true, the commission must endeavor by conference, conciliation and persuasion to elim-
inate the alleged unlawful employment practice. Id. § 2000e-5 (b). The amended Act
provides that if efforts at voluntary conciliation fail, the commission or, in a case where
the respondent is a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, the At-
torney General may bring an action in a federal district court. However, if a charge
filed with the commission is dismissed or if no action has been brought within 180
days of the filing of such charge, the commission must notify the aggrieved party that
he may commence an action within 90 days of such notice. Id. § 2000e-5(f) (1). For
a discussion of the operation of the EEOC see Blumrosen, Administrative Creativity:
The First Year of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 38 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 695 (1970).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g) (1970).
4. The employee may have remedies under state law. In addition, the employee may
seek relief from the National Labor Relations Board, claiming that the discrimination
by the employer violated section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29,
U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970). See United Packinghouse Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB,
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collective bargaining agreement with the employer contains grievance
and arbitration provisions through which the employee may seek re-
dress. The multiplicity of remedies for employment discrimination
has proved problematic; specifically, the federal courts of appeals are
divided on the question of what course of action a district court should
pursue when a Title VII action is instituted after the employee has
received an adverse decision in an arbitration proceeding.5
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently made a sig-
nificant attempt to maintain arbitration as a viable means of resolving
labor disputes involving charges of discrimination, while preserving
to aggrieved employees the opportunity to have a full and complete
resolution of their Title VII rights. The court held in Rios v. Reynolds
Metals Company" that a district court may defer to a prior arbitration
decision but only under certain limited conditions. Before examining
the impact of Rios, a study of the cases which previously have consid-
ered the question is essential.
In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,1 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that a Title VII suit could not be maintained after the
grievance had been finally adjudicated by arbitration. The court rea-
soned that since the decision of the arbitrator would have been final
and binding on the employer, it would be unfair to hold that the award
was not binding on the employee. Noting that the parties had agreed
on a mutually satisfactory arbitrator and that the arbitrator had juris-
diction to decide the grievance, the court held that where both factors
of consent and jurisdiction obtain, the decision of the arbitrator should
be final.8
416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969). Finally, the employee
could allege a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). See
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Workers of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.
1970); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 948 (1971); Young v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d
Cir. 1971).
5. The Supreme Court faced the question in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S.
689 (1971), with an equally divided Court affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit.
6. 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972).
7. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
8. The court emphasized the possible adverse effects of permitting an employee to
institute a Title VII suit after an adverse arbitration decision when the same course
of action would not be available to an employer. It was believed that this result would
reduce the attractiveness to employers of including arbitration clanses in collective
bargaining agreements and, in fact, "could sound the death knell to arbitration of labor
disputes." Id. at 332.
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Shortly after the decision in Dewey, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit arrived at a substantially different result in Hutchings v.
United States Industries, Inc. While conceding the importance of the
policy favoring private settlement of labor disputes by arbitration, the
court in Hutchings stressed the essential differences between the arbi-
tration process and a court hearing and concluded that a prior arbitra-
tion decision does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction over
Title VII actions.10 However, the possible effect of prior arbitration
was not completely rejected. The court stated that both arbitral awards
and grievance determination settlements could be used as evidence in
Title VII litigation. Moreover, it specifically reserved for the future "the
question of whether a procedure similar to that applied by the labor
board in deferring to arbitration awards when certain standards are
met might properly be adopted in Title VII cases." 11
In Newman v. Avoo Corp.,2 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit noted that its decision in Dewey was based upon the doctrine of
estoppel' 3 rather than an election of remedies.14 However, the court
distinguished Dewey and held that an aggrieved employee is not
estopped to assert his Title VII claim even though that claim has been
9. 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
10. The court stated: "An important method for the fulfillment of congressional
purpose [of eliminating discrimination] is the utilization of private grievance-arbitra-
tion procedures .... Congress, however, has made the federal judiciary, not the EEOC
or the private arbitrator, the final arbiter of an individual's Title VII grievance." Id.
at 313.
11. Id. at 314 n.10.
12. 451 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1971).
13. The court noted: "This equitable doctrine holds that where the parties have
agreed to resolve their grievances before 1) a fair and impartial tribunal 2) which had
power to decide them, a District Court should defer to the fact finding thus accom-
plished." 451 F.2d at 747.
14. Several commentators had asserted that Dewey was decided on the basis ,of the
doctrine of election of remedies. See, e.g. Edwards and Kaplan, Religious Discrmina-
tion and the Role of Arbitration Under Title VII, 69 Micr. L. Rzv. 599, 613, 642 (1971);
Note, Title VII, the NLRB, and Arbitration: Conflicts in National Labor Policy, 5
GA. L. Rzv. 313, 344-47 (1971). The Newman court noted that the doctrine is applicable
"only where conflicting and inconsistent remedies are sought on the basis of conflicting
and inconsistent rights." 451 F.2d at 746-47 n.1. Criticizing the doctrine as having
fallen into disrepute, the court further stressed that it was not applicable to Dewey,
since there was no conflict in the facts presented in the arbitration and judicial pro-
ceedings and since the remedies sought were complementary rather than conflicting.
The Newman court suggested that the basis of the decision in Dewey was "a com-
bination of the desire for finality and the belief that arbitration is the sure and sound
path to labor harmony-policies which are more accurately expressed in the themes of
res judicata and collateral estoppel than in election of remedies." Id.
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the subject of a final arbitration award. It was emphasized that since
the collective bargaining agreement required that the grievance be sub-
mitted to arbitration, it could not be said that submission of the grievance
was "clearly voluntary" on the part of the employee. Furthermore,
the court doubted that the arbitrator had the right to make a final
determination of the racial discrimination issue, since there was no pro-
vision in the collective bargaining agreement prohibiting discrimina-
tory employment practices. Additionally, the employee's allegation that
his union had participated in a "long-standing conspiracy" with the
company to perpetuate racial discrimination contributed to the court's
conclusion that deferral was not appropriate. These circumstances were
found to represent a "fundamental attack upon the fairness and im-
partiality of the arbitration proceeding" and to warrant a judicial hear-
ing under Tide VII.'
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently affirmed in a
per curiam decision the holding of the district court in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co. 16 After reviewing the "two diametric lines of au-
thority" on the question of the effect of prior arbitration on a Title
VII action, the district court adopted the rationale of Dewey and re-
jected that of Hutcbings. Applying the Dewey rationale, the court
stated: "[W] hen an employee voluntarily submits a claim of discrimi-
nation to arbitration under a union contract grievance procedure . . .
the employee is bound by the arbitration award just as is the employer.
We cannot accept a philosophy which gives the employee two strings
to his bow when the employer has only one." 17
It was in this context of divided authority that the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co.' s attempted to reach
a decision which would accommodate the policy of settling labor dis-
putes by arbitration and the policy of providing an adequate remedy
for Title VII violations. Rios, a Mexican-American, had been assigned
to a higher position on a trial basis but demoted to his former position
after only one month. He filed a grievance pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement, claiming that he had not been allowed a reason-
able trial period at the new position. At the ensuing arbitration hear-
ing, Rios alleged that the demotion had been based in part on his national
origin and that the company's action thus had violated a provision of
15. 451 F.2d at 748.
16. 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972), aff'g 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971).
17. 346 F. Supp. at 1019.
18. 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972).
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the collective bargaining agreement prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of race, color, creed, national origin, or sex. Prior to the arbitration
hearing, Rios had initiated a Title VII action in a federal district court.
Following the arbitrator's determination that the demotion had resulted
from Rios' inability to perform the new job satisfactorily, the district
court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that Rios was bound by the decision of the arbitrator.1"
The court of appeals, while reversing the decision of the lower court,
recognized that the Supreme Court2° repeatedly has stressed that "settle-
ment of labor disputes by arbitration is a favored national labor pol-
icy." 21 Thus, for example, where an employee brings an action in
federal district court asserting a breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment after that claim has been submitted to arbitration, the sole inquiry
for the court is whether the arbitrator had the power, under the col-
lective bargaining agreement, to decide the issues raised. If such power
is found to have existed, the court may not reexamine the merits of the
claim, and the decision of the arbitrator is binding.
22
The Rios court held, however, that the strong national policy against
discriminatory employment practices manifested by Congress in Title
VII required a departure from the traditional approach to arbitration.
The remedy afforded by Title VII was said to be supplemental to, and
existing apart from, other remedies provided an aggrieved employee
by contract or by federal or state law. Reaffirming its decision in
Hutchings, the court stated that even where an employee pursues one
of these alternative remedies, the federal court remains the "final arbiter"
of Title VII rights.
While accepting the position that the federal judiciary has the power
to make a final adjudication in a Title VII proceeding, the court was
unwilling to hold that a district court should never defer to a prior
arbitration decision. The court acknowledged the arguments which
had been determinative in Dewey23 and stated:
19. 332 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
20. See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co, 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
21. 467 F.2d at 56.
22. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
23. See note 8 supra & accompanying text.
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It does not follow, however, that the policies of Title VII re-
quire that an employee who has submitted his claim to binding
arbitration must always be given an opportunity to relitigate his
claim in court. In some instances such a requirement would not
comport with elementary notions of equity, for it would give
the employee, but not the employer, a second chance to have the
same issue resolved.24
The court also observed that an absolute prohibition against deferral
in Title VII actions would tend to frustrate the national policy favor-
ing arbitration by removing the incentive for an employer to agree to
the inclusion of arbitration provisions in the contract.
It should be noted that in Rios there were two factors not present
in the same court's decision in Hutchings. First, the collective bargaining
agreement placed upon the employer an obligation similar to that
imposed by Title VII. Moreover, the court found that the issue decided
by the arbitrator was the same as that presented in the Title VII action.
The court seized upon these factors to implement the procedure it
had suggested in Hutchings, holding that a "federal district court in
the exercise of its power as the final arbiter under Title VII may follow
a . . . procedure of deferral" under certain strict limitations.25 After
enumerating the conditions required for deferral, the court remanded
the case to the district court to determine whether these conditions
had been met.
The procedure adopted was analogous to the one employed by the
National Labor Relations Board in deferring to prior arbitration deci-
sions concerning alleged unfair labor practices.26 Thus, it was held
that a district court properly may defer to a prior arbitration if the
following conditions of limitation are established:
First, there may be no deference to the decision of the arbitrator
unless the contractual right coincides with rights under Title VII.
24. 467 F.2d at 57.
25. Id. at 58.
26. In Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), the NLRB established minimum
standards which must be met before the Board, in the exercise of its discretion, will
defer to a prior arbitration award involving the same issues presented in an unfair labor
practice complaint. Thus, the Board will defer to arbitration findings only if "the
proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties have agreed to be bound,
and the decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and
policies of the Act." Id. at 1082. The Board's deferral procedure has received the
sanction of the courts. See, e.g., Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261




Second, it must be plain that the arbitrator's decision is in no way
violative of the private rights guaranteed by Title VII, nor of the
public policy which inheres in Title VII. In addition, before de-
ferring, the district court must be satisfied that (1) the factual
issues before it are identical to those decided by the arbitrator;
(2) the arbitrator had power under the collective agreement to
decide the ultimate issue of discrimination; (3) the evidence pre-
sented at the arbitral hearing dealt adequately with all factual
issues; (4) the arbitrator actually decided the factual issues pre-
sented to the court; (5) the arbitration proceeding was fair and
regular and free of procedural infirmities. The burden of proof in
establishing these conditions of limitation will be upon the re-
spondent as distinguished from the claimant.27
Clearly, the Rios review of arbitral awards is more rigorous than
judicial review of arbitral awards in other labor law contexts. Indeed,
the court stated that because of the compelling interests sought to be
protected by Title VII, deferral in such cases "is not as broad as" deferral
in other situations and is, in essence, "a review of the arbitration
proceeding in cases involving Tide VII rights." 28 It would appear that
under the Rios test, deferral would have been proper in none of the
four cases which previously had raised the issue at the court of appeals
level. In Alexander, for example, the findings of the arbitrator did not
discuss the employee's assertion of discrimination, but stated only that
the discharge had been for "just cause." In neither Dewey nor Hutcb-
ings was there a nondiscrimination clause in the contract binding the
employer to the obligations imposed by Tide VII. Finally, in Newman,
there were strong indications that the arbitration proceeding had not
been fair and regular.29
27. 467 F.2d at 58.
28. Id.
29. The court in Rios suggested that its holding "may be somewhat in line with the
result which has evolved in the Sixth Circuit" in Dewey and Neumm. 467 F.2d at
59 n.3. The Sixth Circuit's approach appeared to the Rios court to require that an
aggrieved employee be permitted to pursue a Title VII action after an adverse arbi-
tration award unless certain conditions are met. These conditions, apparently found
in Nemnan, are: "[T]he arbitration proceeding must have been fair and impartial. The
issue presented to the court under Title VII must be the same as the issue decided by
the arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator must have
had power, under the collective bargaining agreement, to decide the issues he decided:'
Id. However, in light of the fact that Newman did not overrule Dewey, and because
the issue presented to the Dewey court was not the same issue decided by the arbi-
trator under the collective bargaining agreement, the Sixth Circuit's approach is not
1973] 1009
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It is submitted that the result in Rios represents an acceptable accom-
modation of conflicting policy considerations. By providing that arbi-
tration may, under limited circumstances, be employed as a final means
of determining grievances which involve Tide VII rights, the court
left available to the parties the opportunity to frame the collective bar-
gaining agreement and to conduct the arbitration proceeding in such
manner that a district court would find deferral appropriate. 30  This
result, however, does detract substantially from the weight normally
accorded the decision of an arbitrator by a federal court. In order to
determine the propriety of this departure from the traditional approach
to arbitration and to suggest the appropriateness of the Rios conditions
for deferral, it is necessary to examine the nature of the rights con-
ferred by Title VII and the comparative abilities of arbitration and
judicial proceedings to protect those rights.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in its decisions in
Hutchings and Rios acted on the premise that Title VII created rights
and remedies separate and distinct from those afforded an aggrieved
employee by the collective bargaining agreement. Two different rights
are asserted in the arbitration and judicial proceedings-one contractual,
the other statutory.3 ' Viewed in this light, it is incorrect to characterize
a Title VII action as an appeal from a prior arbitration award. 2 It is
only when the employee's contractual and statutory rights coincide
because of the inclusion of a provision in the collective bargaining
agreement imposing upon the employer the obligations required of
him by Title VII that it is possible to suggest that arbitration is an
acceptable substitute for the judicial proceeding to which the employee
is entitled by the terms of Title VII.
Moreover, even though an employee's contractual and statutory
rights coincide, the remedies which the arbitrator may apply under the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement may be limited. "The
arbitrator . . . may consider himself constrained to apply the contract,
clear. Thus, the Rios court's qualification that its result "may be somewhat in line"
with that of the Sixth Circuit was necessary.
30. It is obvious that the employer would seek to meet the conditions in order to
reduce litigation costs resulting from having to defend in both forums. Moreover, if an
employee were assured of fair treatment in the arbitration proceeding, he too would
prefer to avoid a costly and time consuming court suit pursuant to Title VII. See
Comment, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.: Labor Arbitration and Title VII, 119 U. PA.
L. REv. 684, 693 (1971).
31. See 10 DuQuESEm L. REv. 461, 466 (1972); 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1314, 1318 (1970).
32. See Comment, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.: Labor Arbitration and Title VI!,
119 U. PA. L. REv. 684 (1972).
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and not give the types of remedies available under Title VII, even
though the contract may contain an anti-discrimination provision."8
A court in a Title VII action, however, may order affirmative action,
such as reinstatement or hiring of employees with back pay, or it may
enjoin the offender from further discriminatory conduct. 4
In addition to establishing a right of the individual employee, Title
VII manifests a strong public interest in the elimination of discrimina-
tion.s5 It would be possible for an arbitration award or grievance settle-
ment to resolve the grievance of the individual employee, yet permit
the employer to perpetuate a system of discrimination. The Rios court,
in establishing the conditions which must be satisfied before a district
court may defer to prior arbitration, recognized the nature of the
interests which Congress sought to protect through Tide VII. Thus,
before deferring to prior arbitration, the district court must be satisfied
that the contractual rights upon which the arbitrator based his decision
coincided with the statutory rights guaranteed the employee by Tide
VII. Moreover, the decision of the arbitrator not only must have pro-
tected the private rights guaranteed by Title VII, but also must not
have been violative of the "public policy which inheres in Title VII." 8
However, beyond the possibility that the arbitration proceeding
may not involve rights sufficiently similar to those guaranteed by Title
VII, it is necessary to consider the possible inadequacies of the arbi-
tration process to protect or enforce those rights. 7 Thus, for example,
an arbitrator may not have "special training in law-let alone an expertise
in the fast moving complexities of labor and civil rights law." 38 Fur-
thermore, complete objectivity in arbitration might be difficult to
achieve, especially in cases where both the union and the employer,
the parties who select the arbitrator, are alleged to be guilty of dis-
crimination.8" In addition, arbitration hearings generally are informal; 40
33. Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc, 428 F.2d 303, 312 (5th Cir. 1970).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g) (1970).
35. See Hebert & Reischel, Title VII and the Multiple Approaches to Eliminating
Employment Discrimination, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 449, 467 (1971).
36. 467 F.2d at 58.
37. See Hebert & Reischel, supra note 35, at 469.
38. Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118
U. PA. L. REv. 40, 48 (1969).
39. See 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 404, 409 (1969). Possible abuses of the union position as
bargaining agent might include a refusal to include certain charges or to prosecute
them to their fullest extent, such as was the case in Newman. There is also the possi-
bility of settlement without the employee's consent. Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S: 171
(1967).
40. Lawyers, briefs, and transcripts of proceedings are present in less than half of
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rules of evidence often are ignored, and witnesses often are not under
oath.41 The employee usually will be represented by a union official,
who ordinarily is not an attorney. Generally, there is no written
opinion setting forth the reasoning used to arrive at the decision.42
Under such circumstances, the employee may be denied the procedural
protection afforded him in a Title VII action.
The conditions enunciated by the Rios court which must be met
before a district court may defer to a prior arbitration award, how-
ever, evidence a concern with the possible inadequacies of the arbitra-
tion process to protect the rights guaranteed by Tide VII. Thus,
apart from a broad requirement that "the arbitration proceeding was
fair and regular and free of procedural infirmities," a district court,
before deferring, must be satisfied that "the evidence presented at the
arbitral hearing dealt adequately with all factual issues. . . . In
order to satisfy this requirement, together with the condition that the
factual issues before the court must be identical to those actually decided
by the arbitrator, it will be almost mandatory that there be a relatively
complete record of the arbitration proceeding.
There is no evidence that Congress intended that the remedies estab-
lished by Title VII should be affected by the existence of other remedies
available to an employee under a collective bargaining agreement or
under state or federal law.44 Consistent with this view, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has relied on the strong national policy
manifested by Title VII against discriminatory employment practices in
holding that the remedies of Title VII are supplemental to other reme-
dies, and that the federal courts, in all instances, are the final arbiters
of Title VII rights. Moreover, without detracting from the policies
inherent in Title VII, the court has accommodated the national labor
policy favoring private settlement of labor disputes through arbitration
by enumerating conditions, appropriately stringent, under which a
all arbitrations. Lev & Fishman, Suggestions to Management: Arbitration v. The Labor
Board, 10 B.C. ID'n. & CoM. L. REv. 763, 768 (1969). Cf. Dunau, Three Problems in
Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REv. 427, 437 (1969).
41. Cf. Lev & Fishman, supra note 40.
42. See Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, 34 U.
Ci. L. REv. 545, 555 (1967).
43. 467 F.2d at 58.
44. See Hebert & Reischel, supra note 35, at 459. See generally Vaas, Title VII:
Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 431 (1966); Blumrosen, Administrative
Creativity: The First Year of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 38
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 695 (1970).
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federal court properly may defer to the decision of an arbitrator. The
result permits the continued viability of arbitration while guaranteeing
that the private and public rights created by Title VII will receive
adequate protection.
